Diplomatic Compass · Edition No. 4 · 19 January 2026 · By Hafsa M. Temsamani, PhD

Editorial

Reading the Signals, Naming the Stakes

As 2026 begins, strategic signals are sharpening across the Euro-Atlantic and Southern neighbourhood. From heightened US pressure over Greenland and NATO’s Article 5 commitment, to evolving security guarantees for Ukraine, and rising instability linked to Iran and the Red Sea, the issues at play are no longer abstract.

This edition of Diplomatic Compass focuses on what these signals reveal: how Alliance obligations are being tested, where security risks are accumulating, and how decisions taken in Washington, the Arctic, Europe and the Middle East increasingly intersect. It also reflects on the role of strategic engagement beyond hard security, including recent discussions hosted by Enabel, Belgium’s development agency, on fragility and resilience in complex environments. Rather than treating these developments in isolation, the objective is to read them together — as part of a broader strategic trajectory shaping the year ahead.

I. NATO Affairs

Greenland, the White House and NATO’s Arctic Test

Greenland has re-emerged as a strategic pressure point in the High North as great-power competition intensifies and Arctic access, infrastructure and early-warning capabilities gain renewed importance. This shift became explicit on 14 January 2026, when a White House consultation between the United States, Denmark and Greenland elevated what might otherwise have remained a bilateral discussion into a broader Alliance-level test.

At stake is not Greenland’s strategic relevance — long acknowledged — but how U.S. security concerns are placing new strain on Alliance discipline and established collective defence practices. Greenland sits at the intersection of US security interests, Danish sovereignty and Alliance commitments. Crucially, Greenland’s security is a NATO responsibility, not an EU competence. As part of the Kingdom of Denmark, Greenland falls fully under NATO’s Article 5 collective defence guarantee, while remaining outside the European Union’s political, legal and defence structures. This distinction is not semantic: it determines where authority, responsibility and escalation management ultimately reside in the High North.

That balance has historically been stabilised by the 1951 Defence of Greenland Agreement, which grants the United States extensive basing rights while fully respecting Danish sovereignty. The agreement remains in force. What has changed is the surrounding strategic environment — and the political framing of Arctic risk — with increased Russian and Chinese activity now more prominently shaping US and Allied threat perceptions.

For NATO, the central challenge exposed by the White House meeting is therefore structural: how U.S. security concerns are placing new strain on Alliance cohesion and collective defence norms. European Allies’ response has been telling. Denmark has reinforced its posture in and around Greenland, while Allied deployments and exercises have signalled that Greenland is treated as an Alliance responsibility, not a bilateral bargaining variable.

Looking ahead, the issue is likely to gain further visibility during the World Economic Forum (19–23 January 2026), where President Donald Trump, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and senior European leaders are expected to converge. While Davos is not a decision-making forum, it functions as a strategic signalling arena, where positions on burden-sharing, Alliance credibility and security priorities are informally tested and aligned ahead of formal NATO processes.

Ultimately, the Greenland episode illustrates a broader trend. The Arctic is no longer peripheral to NATO’s agenda; it is a live theatre where Alliance cohesion, credibility and risk management are being tested in real time. How NATO navigates this moment will shape not only Arctic security, but the Alliance’s capacity to manage internal strain while adapting to intensifying strategic competition.

II. Euro-Atlantic Security

Ukraine’s Security Guarantees: Inside the Coalition of the Willing

As the war in Ukraine enters its fourth year, partners within the Coalition of the Willing are intensifying discussions on how security guarantees for Ukraine could be structured alongside sustained military support. Meeting in Paris on 6 January 2026 with the participation of Ukraine and the United States, the Coalition focused on shaping long-term deterrence without presuming a ceasefire or peace agreement.

Discussions reaffirmed that Ukraine’s armed forces remain the central pillar of defence. Participants examined continued military assistance, defence cooperation and options for structured security guarantees that could be activated under defined conditions, complementing existing bilateral arrangements. Coordination mechanisms, including potential monitoring frameworks and multinational support options, were also discussed.

Belgium signalled readiness to contribute air, maritime and training capabilities within this framework, once conditions permit, stressing that such efforts would be anchored in a broader architecture supported by a firm US backstop.

III. NATO–EU Cooperation

Who Pays for Defence? A European NATO Ally Tries Something New

Luxembourg has become the first European NATO Ally in the post–Second World War period to issue a dedicated sovereign defence bond, announced on 15 January 2026, signalling a shift from political commitments on defence spending toward concrete financing mechanisms. The move is directly linked to NATO Allies’ agreement to move toward a 5% of GDP trajectory for defence and defence-related spending, adopted at the 2025 Hague Summit, which is placing sustained pressure on national budgets across the Alliance.

For Luxembourg, meeting this trajectory implies a substantial increase in defence and infrastructure expenditure over the coming decade. The three-year bond, offering a fixed interest rate of 2.25% and capped at €150 million, is intended as an innovative financing tool to complement traditional budgetary resources, alongside national debt and infrastructure adjustments. Proceeds will be channelled through the national budget and allocated to defence-related investments, including equipment, infrastructure, research and emerging technologies.

While national in form, the initiative reflects a broader NATO–EU dynamic. NATO sets the level of ambition through capability requirements and spending benchmarks, while the EU and its member states increasingly shape the financial and industrial conditions needed to deliver them. Luxembourg’s bond illustrates how national and EU-linked financial ecosystems — capital markets, savings mobilisation and fiscal incentives — are being leveraged to implement Alliance decisions.

Although modest in scale, the bond issuance highlights a growing shift from abstract spending targets toward delivery-oriented defence finance, pointing to a more operational and practical dimension of NATO–EU cooperation.

IV. Southern Neighbourhood Partnerships

Iran Erupts: Protests, Terrorism Risks and Red Sea Spillover

Anti-regime protests in Iran erupted on 28 December 2025, rapidly escalating into nationwide unrest and a violent crackdown. As of 13 January 2026, the Human Rights News Agency estimates that more than 2,000 people have been killed, while authorities imposed a total internet blackout, severely restricting information flows and verification.

The unrest is unfolding in the immediate aftermath of the 12-day war between Israel and Iran (13–24 June 2025). While the conflict was initiated by Israeli strikes, the United States joined the campaign on 22 June 2025, carrying out direct strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan. The episode significantly degraded Iran’s conventional deterrence and reinforced Tehran’s shift toward asymmetric responses.

Under President Trump, Washington has issued strong warnings but faces no easy military path against an ideological regime fighting for survival. Any further direct intervention would likely trigger meaningful retaliation against US forces and allies, increasing the risk of regional escalation.

As internal pressure mounts, the risk of externalisation through terrorism and proxy violence is rising. This is most visible at sea. In the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, the Houthis, operating as an Iran-aligned proxy, continue missile and drone attacks on commercial shipping, constituting maritime terrorism along a critical global trade corridor.

The consequences extend beyond the region. For Gulf partners, the risks include retaliation against bases and infrastructure. For Europe, Red Sea maritime insecurity directly affects trade flows, energy security and freedom of navigation, increasing pressure on naval deployments and crisis-management efforts in the Southern Neighbourhood.

V. Spotlight Event

Enabel and the Security–Stability Nexus

Enabel Talks with Jean Van Wetter (CEO, Enabel) and Emmanuel de Merode (Director, Virunga National Park), moderated by Katrien Vanderschoot (VRT), 15 January 2026.

I attended a recent Enabel Talks session, hosted by Enabel, focusing on Virunga National Park and the Green Corridor in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Held on 15 January 2026, the event offered timely insight into how development actors operate in highly fragile and contested environments.

The discussion, including interventions by Emmanuel de Merode (Director, Virunga National Park) and Jean Van Wetter (CEO, Enabel), echoed a core theme running across this newsletter: security outcomes increasingly depend on non-military instruments. In contexts marked by armed groups, weak governance and economic marginalisation, development, resilience and local engagement are not peripheral — they form part of the broader stabilisation toolkit.

From a European and transatlantic perspective, Enabel’s work illustrates how national agencies contribute to wider EU and international efforts aimed at addressing the long-term drivers of instability in the Southern Neighbourhood and beyond. These approaches complement hard-security responses by tackling structural vulnerabilities that, if left unaddressed, can fuel conflict, irregular migration and transnational threats.

Beyond the substance, the event provided a valuable opportunity to engage with the Enabel community and partners, reinforcing the importance of sustained dialogue between development, policy and security practitioners.

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Closing Note

This concludes the Diplomatic Compass Newsletter. Thank you for reading and for joining me. I look forward to delivering weekly insights across NATO affairs, Euro-Atlantic security, NATO–EU cooperation, and Southern Neighbourhood partnerships.